Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense

The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (BRSPB) is a panel of former high-ranking government officials and academic experts that analyzes the United States' defense capabilities against biological threats. The purpose of the group is to examine the entire biodefense system and find ways to fix it.[1] As the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies described it, "The panel was formed to recommend changes to U.S. policy and law to strengthen national biodefense while optimizing resource investments."[2]

BRSPB was supported by institutional sponsors and donor organizations. Sponsors include the Hudson Institute and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies,[3] and donor organizations include Give Well,[4] a non-profit group of individual donors.[5]

Panel Members, Staff, and Ex Officios

Senator Joe Lieberman
Governor Tom Ridge

The BRSPB is co-chaired by former Senator Joe Lieberman and former Governor Tom Ridge.[4]

Role Name Former positions
Co-chair Joe Lieberman United States Senator and Democratic

nominee for Vice President

Co-chair Tom Ridge Secretary of Homeland Security and

Governor of Pennsylvania

Co-director Ellen P. Carlin, DVM Former fellow at the FDA Center

for Veterinary Medicine and professional staff at the House

Committee on Homeland Security

Co-director Asha M. George, DrPH Former professional staff at the House

Committee on Homeland Security

Panelist Donna Shalala Secretary of Health and Human Services
Panelist Tom Daschle United States Senator, Senate Majority Leader, and Senate

Democratic Leader

Panelist Jim Greenwood United States Congressman
Panelist Kenneth Wainstein Former Homeland Security Adviser, Attorney
Ex officio

member

 Gerald Parker Vice president for public health

preparedness and response at

Texas A&M Health Science Center

Sources:[3][4][6][7]

Background

Between 2001 and 2014, the U.S. spent around $80 billion on biodefense.[1] The BRSPB spent a year in meetings, interviews, and conducting research. It studied the 2001 anthrax attacks and it looked at each biodefense program enacted under Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.[8]

In October 2015, BRSPB submitted its recommendations to Congress in the form of a report that was created after a year of deep study. The conclusion was this: the United States is not prepared to respond to a biological weapon attack. As for the cause of the problem, the report said, “Simply put, the nation does not afford the biological threat the same level of attention as it does other threats.”[8]

The National Blueprint for Biodefense

BRSPB conducted a year-long research study of how the U.S. should address biological threats. In terms of “biological threats”, the study covered both man-made (terrorist and accidental) as well as natural threats. The study culminated in a report to the public and Congress released on October 28, 2015.[9]

The group’s report was titled The National Blueprint for Biodefense.[10]

The report described threats posed by the Islamic State, as well as “mishandling of lethal biological agents by the U.S. government,” as reasons for making biodefense preparedness a higher national priority.[8] BRSPB’s final report had 33 recommendations and over 100 specific items associated with those recommendations.[10]

The report proposes congressional oversight hearings on the following list of issues:[11]

Identified problems

The international symbol for biological hazard.

The BRSPB report said that there existed almost no urgency within the federal government for dealing with the risk of a biological event.[9]

Issues not taken seriously

A major issue is that the government does not appear to take events related to biological safety seriously enough. One security expert concluded, "The tragic saga of the death of Thomas Eric Duncan from Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) serves as a perfect demonstration of the shambolic state of biodefense in the United States in late 2014."[1] Another expert estimated that the consequences of inaction on BRSPB’s recommendations would be that the report would serve as a “guidebook for placing blame.”[9]

Obsolete practices and procedures

Another major issue is the federal government's failure to update its practices and procedures as they relate to biological threats.

For example, currently there is a system within the National Institutes of Health and Food and Drug Administration that would fast-track the approval of medical countermeasures in the event of a biological attack. However, Tom Ridge told a Senate committee during a hearing that the fast-track process is obsolete. Page 52 of the report reads, “A systemic, risk averse culture has emerged that is stifling [medical countermeasures] innovation. If this continues to evolve, progress on biodefense objectives will be curtained and the still nascent biodefence industry will have little incentive to participate.”[9]

Another example is the practice of stockpiling vaccines against a biological agent. This practice is now considered obsolete, the BRSPB concluded. Terrorist organizations are already able to “merge the toxic attributes of more than one agent.” To replace vaccine stockpiles, BRSPB recommended a “vaccines-on-demand approach.”[9]

Proposed solutions

The National Blueprint for Biodefense, BRSPB's final report, laid out a series of solutions.

Major recommendations

The primary changes the U.S. government should take, according to the panel’s report, are the following:[1]

Proposal Specific action
Vice President's office Centralize all biodefense nationally into a command-and-control strategy to be run under the office of the Vice President of the United States
Inclusion and expansion beyond terror threats Include all biological threats, not just those from terrorism, into a national strategy
Bio-surveillance improvement Improve bio-surveillance from technology but also from front-line health workers such as emergency room staff, nurses and doctors
Select Agent Program Change the criteria for a biological agent to become included on the list known as the “Select Agent Program”, which is a list of toxins that pose a severe threat to health and safety (the Department of Homeland Security maintains the list)

Vice President's office

One of BRSPB’s major recommendations was to place responsibility of biodefense leadership into the hands of the Office of the Vice President of the United States. By doing so, biodefense would have “the ear of the president and the ability to coordinate budgets and plans across agencies,” the BRSPB said. In such a scenario, the White House Biodefense Coordination Council would execute the day-to-day work, Senator Lieberman said during testimony in front of the House Homeland Security Committee.[9]

By placing responsibility for biodefense in the hands of the Vice President’s office, it would “transcend the bureaucratic and budgetary rivalries of various agencies in order to create an effective platform for dealing with biological attacks.”[8]

Inclusion and expansion beyond terror threats

The report suggested that the government merge duplicate processes by including all biological threats, not just those from terrorism, into a national strategy. For example, the "OneHealth approach" is one recommendation made by BRSPB that would merge strategies for dealing with human and animal health biodefense programs.[9]

Other select recommendations

"Innovation funds"

Aerial photo of the National Institutes of Health Mark O. Hatfield Clinical Research Center in Bethesda, Maryland

BRSPB called for new Innovation Funds at the National Institutes of Health, and for ten percent of those funds to be dedicated to building technology that would allow multiple antigens in a countermeasure to be delivered from a single platform. Similarly, BRSPB called for ten percent of funds from the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) for the same purpose.[9]

Command and control coordination

Dr. George told Homeland Prep News that in order for the government’s defense against a biological attack to be sufficient, a new comprehensive program needs to be develop. The programs and activities under a new approach would need to be “coordinated, collaborative and innovative.”[10]

The report recommends that all types of biological threats should be included in a single, command-and-control strategy. By different types, they meant “biological warfare, bioterrorism, biocrimes, pandemic illness, and accidental release.”[1]

Activities

The panel’s activities include research, discussion meetings, issuing a report, and testifying before Congress. The group held four meetings in which it discussed the current status of the country’s biodefense efforts.[4]

Dr. George said that for 2016, BRSPB would focus its efforts on staying engaged with Congress to help it understand and make the improvements that the BRSPB report outlined.[10]

Additionally, BRSPB teamed up with the Alliance for Biosecurity and Trust for America’ Health to conduct a survey of Americans’ thoughts about biosecurity. According to the Alliance for Biosecurity, Americans are concerned about biological threats.[12]

In September 2016, the Open Philanthropy Project granted the panel a $1.3 million grant in support of the panel's influential leadership role in the evaluation of the nation’s biodefense systems. Tom Ridge said, "It is troubling that we still do not have a comprehensive approach to preparing for and responding to biological events. That is why this grant from Open Philanthropy is so critical. It will allow us to push forward the recommendations detailed in our National Blueprint and seek to put them into action."[13]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 "Improving the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Biodefense Report". Just Security. 2016-02-25. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  2. ↑ "Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense Report: A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts". www.potomacinstitute.org. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  3. 1 2 "Parker appointed to Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense - Vital Record". Vital Record. 2015-01-27. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  4. 1 2 3 4 "Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense Grant | GiveWell". GiveWell. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  5. ↑ "About GiveWell | GiveWell". GiveWell. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  6. ↑ Carlin, Ellen P. (2016-02-05). "The Nation's Medical Countermeasure Stockpile: Opportunities to Improve the Sustainability of the CDC Strategic National Stockpile, A Workshop" (PDF). Institute of Medicine. National Academy of Sciences. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  7. ↑ "Robert Kadlec M.D. | C-SPAN.org". www.c-span.org. Retrieved 2016-06-24.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Gibbons-Neff, Thomas (2015-10-28). "Blue Ribbon Panel report: United States lacking in biodefense". Washington Post. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel Report Sends Strong Messages – Is Anyone Listening?". Security Debrief. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  10. 1 2 3 4 "Q&A with co-director of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense - Homeland Preparedness News". Homeland Preparedness News. 2016-03-17. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  11. ↑ "A National Blueprint for Biodefense" (PDF). biodefensestudy.org. Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. pp. 64–67. Retrieved 2016-06-24.
  12. ↑ "Survey Results Show Americans Are Concerned About Biosecurity Threats And Believe The Government Should Invest More In Preparedness (Press release)" (PDF). media.wix.com. Alliance for Biosecurity and Trust for America's Health. 2016-04-20. Retrieved 2016-05-20.
  13. ↑ "Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel Receives Major Funding Award". Homeland Security Today. 2016-09-21. Retrieved 2016-10-03.

External links

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 11/15/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.