City of Ladue v. Gilleo

City of Ladue v. Gilleo

Argued February 23, 1994
Decided June 13, 1994
Full case name City of Ladue, et al. v. Margaret P. Gilleo
Citations

512 U.S. 43 (more)

114 S. Ct. 2038
Prior history Court of Appeals rules for Gilleo
Holding
A municipal ordinance aiming to reduce visual clutter through the regulation of signs in the yards of private homes that prohibits protected speech may violate the First Amendment if the ordinance cannot pass strict scrutiny.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Stevens, joined by unanimous
Concurrence O'Connor
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Amend. I
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City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), was a free speech decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It was a case challenging the legality of a city ordinance restricting the placement of signs in the yards of residents of Ladue, MO.

Background

Margaret P. Gilleo was a resident of Ladue, MO. On December 8, 1990, she placed a sign in her front yard expressing her opposition to a war in the Persian Gulf and encouraging viewers to contact Congress regarding this matter. Her sign disappeared, so she erected yet another. After this sign, too, disappeared, Gilleo filed a complaint with the police, who informed her that such signs were prohibited by city ordinance. Ladue had a broad ban on signs, making exceptions for only ten instances, including residential markers, home sale signs, commercial signs in properly-zoned areas, etc. After being refused a variance, Gilleo filed suit in federal court against the city, Mayor Edith Spinks, and the members of the city council. The district court struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, and this decision was affirmed by the appeals court.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the ruling of the Appeals Court. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, expressed the Court's suspicion of regulations eliminating an entire form of communication, in this case signs. While Ladue alleged that this regulation was permissible as a restriction on "time, place, and manner" since residents could express themselves via other means, the Court found that there were no means that would be adequate substitutes. Ladue had also argued that its regulation was content neutral, but this did not satisfy the Court, which still found that the regulation prevented too much speech that is protected.

External links

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