Islam in China (1911–present)

After the fall of the Qing dynasty following the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, Sun Yat-sen, who led the new republic, immediately proclaimed that the country belonged equally to the Han, Hui (Muslim), Meng (Mongol), and the Tsang (Tibetan) peoples. When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Muslims, along with all other religions in China, suffered repression especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). In modern-day China, Islam is undergoing a revival and there has been an upsurge in Islamic expression.

Republic of China

The Manchu dynasty fell in 1911, and the Republic of China was established by Sun Yat Sen, who immediately proclaimed that the country belonged equally to the Han, Hui (Muslim), Meng (Mongol), and the Tsang (Tibetan) peoples. This led to some improvement in relations between these different peoples. The end of the Qing dynasty also marked an increase in Sino-foreign interaction. This led to increased contact between Muslim minorities in China and the Islamic states of the Middle East. By 1939, at least 33 Hui Muslims had studied at Cairo's Al-Azhar University. In 1912, the Chinese Muslim Federation was formed in the capital Nanjing. Similar organization formed in Beijing (1912), Shanghai (1925) and Jinan (1934).[1] Academic activities within the Muslim community also flourished. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, there existed more than a hundred known Muslim periodicals. Thirty journals were published between 1911 and 1937. Although Linxia remained the center for religious activities, many Muslim cultural activities had shifted to Beijing.[2] National organizations like the Chinese Muslim Association were established for Muslims. Muslims served extensively in the National Revolutionary Army and reached positions of importance, like General Bai Chongxi, who became Defence Minister of the Republic of China.

In the first decade of the 20th century, it has been estimated that there were 20 million Muslims in China proper (that is, China excluding the regions of Mongolia and Xinjiang).[3][4][5][6][7] Of these, almost half resided in Gansu, over a third in Shaanxi (as defined at that time) and the rest in Yunnan.[8]

During the Second Sino-Japanese war the Japanese followed what has been referred to as a "killing policy" and destroyed many mosques. According to Wan Lei, "Statistics showed that the Japanese destroyed 220 mosques and killed countless Hui people by April 1941." After the Rape of Nanking mosques in Nanjing were found to be filled with dead bodies.They also followed a policy of economic oppression which involved the destruction of mosques and Hui communities and made many Hui jobless and homeless. Another policy was one of deliberate humiliation. This included soldiers smearing mosques with pork fat, forcing Hui to butcher pigs to feed the soldiers, and forcing girls to supposedly train as geishas and singers but in fact made them serve as sex slaves. Hui cemeteries were destroyed for military reasons.[9] Many Hui fought in the war against Japan. In 1937, during the Battle of Beiping–Tianjin the Chinese government was notified by Muslim General Ma Bufang of the Ma clique that he was prepared to bring the fight to the Japanese in a telegram message..[10] Immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Ma Bufang arranged for a cavalry division under the Muslim General Ma Biao to be sent east to battle the Japanese.[11] Ethnic Turkic Salar Muslims made up the majority of the first cavalry division which was sent by Ma Bufang.[12]

The Hui Muslim county of Dachang was subjected to slaughter by the Japanese.[13]

On 10 February 1938, Legation Secretary of the German Embassy, Rosen, wrote to his Foreign Ministry about a film made in December by Reverend John Magee about the Nanking Massacre to recommend its purchase. Here is an excerpt from his letter and a description of some of its shots, kept in the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. One of the victims killed by the Japanese was a Muslim (Mohammedan) whose name was Ha.

During the Japanese reign of terror in Nanking – which, by the way, continues to this day to a considerable degree – the Reverend John Magee, a member of the American Episcopal Church Mission who has been here for almost a quarter of a century, took motion pictures that eloquently bear witness to the atrocities committed by the Japanese ... One will have to wait and see whether the highest officers in the Japanese army succeed, as they have indicated, in stopping the activities of their troops, which continue even today.[14]
On December 13, about 30 soldiers came to a Chinese house at #5 Hsing Lu Koo in the southeastern part of Nanking, and demanded entrance. The door was open by the landlord, a Mohammedan named Ha. They killed him immediately with a revolver and also Mrs. Ha, who knelt before them after Ha's death, begging them not to kill anyone else. Mrs. Ha asked them why they killed her husband and they shot her. Mrs. Hsia was dragged out from under a table in the guest hall where she had tried to hide with her 1 year old baby. After being stripped and raped by one or more men, she was bayoneted in the chest, and then had a bottle thrust into her vagina. The baby was killed with a bayonet. Some soldiers then went to the next room, where Mrs. Hsia's parents, aged 76 and 74, and her two daughters aged 16 and 14. They were about to rape the girls when the grandmother tried to protect them. The soldiers killed her with a revolver. The grandfather grasped the body of his wife and was killed. The two girls were then stripped, the elder being raped by 2–3 men, and the younger by 3. The older girl was stabbed afterwards and a cane was rammed in her vagina. The younger girl was bayoneted also but was spared the horrible treatment that had been meted out to her sister and mother. The soldiers then bayoneted another sister of between 7–8, who was also in the room. The last murders in the house were of Ha's two children, aged 4 and 2 respectively. The older was bayoneted and the younger split down through the head with a sword.[15]

Muslims affiliated with the Kuomintang moved to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War. In the Kuomintang Islamic insurgency, Muslim Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army forces in Northwest China, in Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, as well as Yunnan, continued an unsuccessful insurgency against the communists from 1950 to 1958, after the general civil war was over.

People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. Through many of the early years there were tremendous upheavals which culminated in the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, Islam, like all religions including traditional Chinese religion, was persecuted by the atheist Red Guards who were encouraged to smash the Four Olds. Traditional Chinese Confucian and Buddhist Temples, Monasteries, Churches and Mosques were all attacked[16] However, while most were suffering malnutrition due to severe food shortages, beef was reserved for Muslim people as much as possible even during the Cultural Revolution. Non-Islam and non-Muslim could only have beef if there happened to be surplus.

Chinese Muslims say that the Soviet Union was worse in regards to its treatment of Islam than China during the "ten black years" (of the Cultural Revolution).[17]

Since the advent of Deng Xiaoping in 1979, the Chinese government liberalised its policies toward Islam and Muslims. New legislation gave all minorities the freedom to use their own spoken and written languages; develop their own culture and education; and practice their religion.[18] More Chinese Muslims than ever before are allowed to go on the Hajj.[19]

China today

Under China's current leadership, Islam is undergoing a modest revival and there are now many mosques in China. There has been an upsurge in Islamic expression and many nationwide Islamic associations have been organised to co-ordinate inter-ethnic activities among Muslims.[20]

In most of China, Muslims have considerable religious freedom, however, in areas like Xinjiang, where there has been unrest among Uighur Muslims, activities are restricted. There is an ethnic separatist movement among the Uighur minority, who are a Turkic people with their own language. Uighur separatists are intent on establishing the East Turkestan Republic, which existed for a few years in the 1930s and as a Soviet Communist puppet state, the Second East Turkestan Republic 1944-1950. The Soviet Union supported Uighur separatists against China during the Sino-Soviet split. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China feared potential separatist goals of Muslim majority in Xinjiang. An April, 1996 agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, however, assures China of avoiding a military conflict. Other Muslim states have also asserted that they have no intentions of becoming involved in China's internal affairs.[21] Like many other minority groups, youngsters are always given special opportunities to go to colleges whenever the college system was available. They were usually recommended by the local officials with minimum academic score requirement.

With economic reform after 1978, health care in China became largely private fee-for-service, after the socialist system of free medical care was abolished due to capitalist reforms. This was widely criticised by Muslims in the North West, who were often unable to obtain medical support in their remote communities.

China banned a book titled "Xing Fengsu" ("Sexual Customs") which insulted Islam and placed its authors under arrest in 1989 after protests in Lanzhou and Beijing by Chinese Hui Muslims, during which the Chinese police provided protection to the Hui Muslim protestors, and the Chinese government organized public burnings of the book.[22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31] The Chinese government assisted them and gave into their demands because Hui do not have a separatist movement, unlike the Uyghurs,[32] Hui Muslim protestors who violently rioted by vandalizing property during the protests against the book were let off by the Chinese government and went unpunished while Uyghur protestors were imprisoned.[33]

In 2007, CCTV, the People's Republic of China's state run television station ordered major advertising agencies not to use pig images, cartoons or slogans "to avoid conflicts with ethnic minorities", a reference to China's Muslims.[34]

In response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting Chinese state-run media attacked Charlie Hebdo for publishing the cartoons insulting Muhammad, with the state-run Xinhua advocated limiting freedom of speech, while another state-run newspaper Global Times said the attack was "payback" for what it characterised as Western colonialism and accusing Charlie Hebdo of trying to incite a clash of civilizations.[35][36]

Different Muslim ethnic groups in different regions are treated differently by the Chinese government in regards to religious freedom. Religious freedom is present for Hui Muslims, who can practice their religion, build Mosques, and have their children attend Mosques, while more controls are placed specifically on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[37] Since the 1980s Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿學校)) have been supported and permitted by the Chinese government among Muslim areas, only specifically excluding Xinjiang from allowing these schools because of separatist sentiment there.[38][39][40][41]

Although religious education for children is officially forbidden by law in China, the Communist party allows Hui Muslims to violate this law and have their children educated in religion and attend Mosques while the law is enforced on Uyghurs. After secondary education is completed, China then allows Hui students who are willing to embark on religious studies under an Imam.[42] China does not enforce the law against children attending Mosques on non-Uyghurs in areas outside of Xinjiang.[43][44]

Hui Muslims who are employed by the state are allowed to fast during Ramadan unlike Uyghurs in the same positions, the amount of Hui going on Hajj is expanding, and Hui women are allowed to wear veils, while Uyghur women are discouraged from wearing them and Uyghurs find it difficult to get passports to go on Hajj.[45]

Hui religious schools are allowed a massive autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader was formed with the approval of the Chinese government even as he admitted to attending an event where Bin Laden spoke.[46][47]

Uyghur views vary by the oasis they live in. China has historically favored Turpan and Hami. Uyghurs in Turfan and Hami and their leaders like Emin Khoja allied with the Qing against Uyghurs in Altishahr. During the Qing dynasty, China enfeoffed the rulers of Turpan and Hami (Kumul) as autonomous princes, while the rest of the Uyghurs in Altishahr (the Tarim Basin) were ruled by Begs.[48] Uyghurs from Turpan and Hami were appointed by China as officials to rule over Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin. Turpan is more economically prosperous and views China more positively than the rebellious Kashgar, which is the most anti-China oasis. Uyghurs in Turpan are treated leniently and favourably by China with regards to religious policies, while Kashgar is subjected to controls by the government.[49][50] In Turpan and Hami, religion is viewed more positively by China than religion in Kashgar and Khotan in southern Xinjiang.[51] Both Uyghur and Han Communist officials in Turpan turn a blind eye to the law and allow religious Islamic education for Uyghur children.[52][53] Celebrating at religious functions and going on Hajj to Mecca is encouraged by the Chinese government, for Uyghur members of the Communist party. From 1979-1989, 350 mosques were built in Turpan.[54] Han, Hui, and the Chinese government are viewed much more positively by Uyghurs specifically in Turpan, with the government providing better economic, religious, and political treatment for them.[55]

Tensions between Hui Muslims and Uyghurs arise because Hui troops and officials often dominated the Uyghurs and crush Uyghur revolts.[56] Xinjiang's Hui population increased by over 520 percent between 1940 and 1982, an average annual growth of 4.4 percent, while the Uyghur population only grew at 1.7 percent. This dramatic increase in Hui population led inevitably to significant tensions between the Hui and Uyghur populations. Some Uyghurs in Kashgar remember that the Hui army at the Battle of Kashgar (1934) massacred 2,000 to 8,000 Uyghurs, which causes tension as more Hui moved into Kashgar from other parts of China.[57] Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism and generally do not want to get involved in conflict in other countries.[58] Hui and Uyghur live separately, attending different mosques.[59]

The Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement's magazine Islamic Turkistan has accused the Chinese "Muslim Brotherhood" (the Yihewani) of being responsible for the moderation of Hui Muslims and the lack of Hui joining jihadist groups in addition to blaming other things for the lack of Hui Jihadists, such as the fact that for more than 300 years Hui and Uyghurs have been enemies of each other, no separatist Islamist organizations among the Hui, the fact that the Hui view China as their home, and the fact that the "infidel Chinese" language is the language of the Hui.[60][61]

Hui Muslim drug dealers are accused by Uyghur Muslims of pushing heroin on Uyghurs.[62] Heroin has been vended by Hui dealers.[63] There is a typecast image in the public eye of heroin being the province of Hui dealers.[64] Hui have been involved in the Golden Triangle drug area.[65]

Sects of Islam

There have been many occurrences of violent sectarian fighting between different Hui sects. Sectarian fighting between Hui sects led to the Jahriyya rebellion in the 1780s and the 1895 revolt. After a hiatus after the People's Republic of China came to power, sectarian infighting resumed in the 1990s in Ningxia between different sects. Several sects refuse to intermarry with each other. One Sufi sect circulated an anti-Salafi pamphlet in Arabic.

Tibetan-Muslim sectarian violence

In Tibet, the majority of Muslims are Hui people. Hatred between Tibeans and Muslims stems from events during the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang's rule in Qinghai such as Ngolok rebellions (1917–49) and the Sino-Tibetan War, but in 1949 the Communists put an end to the violence between Tibetans and Muslims, however, new Tibetan-Muslim violence broke out after China engaged in liberalization. Riots broke out between Muslims and Tibetans over incidents such as bones in soups and prices of balloons, and Tibetans accused Muslims of being cannibals who cooked humans in their soup and of contaminating food with urine. Tibetans attacked Muslim restaurants. Fires set by Tibetans which burned the apartments and shops of Muslims resulted in Muslim families being killed and wounded in the 2008 mid-March riots. Due to Tibetan violence against Muslims, the traditional Islamic white caps have not been worn by many Muslims. Scarfs were removed and replaced with hairnets by Muslim women in order to hide. Muslims prayed in secret at home when in August 2008 the Tibetans burned the Mosque. Incidents such as these which make Tibetans look bad on the international stage are covered up by the Tibetan exile community. The repression of Tibetan separatism by the Chinese government is supported by Hui Muslims.[66] In addition, Chinese-speaking Hui have problems with Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan speaking Kache minority of Muslims).[67]

The main Mosque in Lhasa was burned down by Tibetans and Chinese Hui Muslims were violently assaulted by Tibetan rioters in the 2008 Tibetan unrest.[68] Tibetan exiles and foreign scholars like ignore and do not talk about sectarian violence between Tibetan Buddhists and Muslims.[69] The majority of Tibetans viewed the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 positively and it had the effect of galvanizing anti-Muslim attitudes among Tibetans and resulted in an anti-Muslim boycott against Muslim owned businesses.[69]:17 Tibetan Buddhists propagate a false libel that Muslims cremate their Imams and use the ashes to convert Tibetans to Islam by making Tibetans inhale the ashes, even though the Tibetans seem to be aware that Muslims practice burial and not cremation since they frequently clash against proposed Muslim cemeteries in their area.[69]:19

Since the Chinese government supports and backs up the Hui Muslims, the Tibetans deliberately attack the Hui Muslims as a way to demonstrate anti-government sentiment and because they have a background of sectarian violence against each other since Ma Bufang's rule due to their separate religions and ethnicity and Tibetans resent Hui economic domination.[70]

Islamic education

Jingtang Jiaoyu was a system of Islamic education developed during the Ming dynasty among the Hui, centered around Mosques. The Arabic and Persian language Thirteen Classics were part of the main curriculum.[71] In the madrassas, some Chinese Muslim literature like the Han Kitab were used for educational purposes.[72] Liu Zhi (scholar) wrote texts to help Hui learn Arabic.[73] Persian was the main Islamic foreign language used by Chinese Muslims, followed by Arabic.[74]

Hui Muslim Generals like Ma Fuxiang, Ma Hongkui, and Ma Bufang funded schools or sponsored students studying abroad. Imam Hu Songshan and Ma Linyi were involved in reforming Islamic education inside China.

Muslim Kuomintang officials in the Republic of China government supported the Chengda Teachers Academy, which helped usher in a new era of Islamic education in China, promoting nationalism and Chinese language among Muslims, and fully incorporating them into the main aspects of Chinese society.[75] The Ministry of Education provided funds to the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation for Chinese Muslim's education.[76][77] The President of the federation was General Bai Chongxi (Pai Chung-hsi) and the vice president was Tang Kesan (Tang Ko-san).[78] 40 Sino-Arabic primary schools were founded in Ningxia by its Governor Ma Hongkui.[79]

Imam Wang Jingzhai studied at Al-Azhar University in Egypt along with several other Chinese Muslim students, the first Chinese students in modern times to study in the Middle East.[80] Wang recalled his experience teaching at madrassas in the provinces of Henan (Yu), Hebei (Ji), and Shandong (Lu) which were outside of the traditional stronghold of Muslim education in northwest China, and where the living conditions were poorer and the students had a much tougher time than the northwestern students.[81] In 1931 China sent five students to study at Al-Azhar in Egypt, among them was Muhammad Ma Jian and they were the first Chinese to study at Al-Azhar.[82][83][84][85] Na Zhong, a descendant of Nasr al-Din (Yunnan) was another one of the students sent to Al-Azhar in 1931, along with Zhang Ziren, Ma Jian, and Lin Zhongming.[86]

Hui Muslims from the Central Plains (Zhongyuan) differed in their view of women's education than Hui Muslims from the northwestern provinces, with the Hui from the Central Plains provinces like Henan having a history of women's Mosques and religious schooling for women, while Hui women in northwestern provinces were kept in the house. However, in northwestern China reformers started bringing female education in the 1920s. In Linxia, Gansu, a secular school for Hui girls was founded by the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang, the school was named Shuada Suqin Wmen's Primary School after his wife Ma Suqin who was also involved in its founding.[87] Hui Muslim refugees fled to northwest China from the central plains after the Japanese invasion of China, where they continued to practice women's education and build women's mosque communities, while women's education was not adopted by the local northwestern Hui Muslims and the two different communities continued to differ in this practice.[88]

General Ma Fuxiang donated funds to promote education for Hui Muslims and help build a class of intellectuals among the Hui and promote the Hui role in developing the nation's strength.[89]

After secondary education is completed, Chinese law then allows students who are willing to embark on religious studies under an Imam.[42]

Notes

  1. ↑ Gladney (1999), pg. 457
  2. ↑ Gladney (1999), pg. 458
  3. ↑ Counting up the number of people of traditionally Muslim nationalities who were enumerated in the 1990 census gives a total of 17.6 million, 96% of whom belong to just three nationalities: Hui 8.6 million, Uyghurs 7.2 million, and Kazakhs 1.1 million. Other nationalities that are traditionally Muslim include Kyrghyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Tatars, Salar, Bonan, and Dongxiang. See Dru C. Gladney, "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?", Paper presented at Symposium on Islam in Southeast Asia and China, Hong Kong, 2002. Available at http://www.islamsymposium.cityu.edu.hk. The 2000 census reported a total of 20.3 million members of Muslim nationalities, of which again 96% belonged to just three groups: Hui 9.8 million, Uyghurs 8.4 million, and Kazakhs 1.25 million.
  4. ↑ "CIA – The World Factbook – China". Cia.gov. Retrieved 2009-06-15.
  5. ↑ "China (includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)". State.gov. Retrieved 2009-06-15.
  6. ↑ "NW China region eyes global Muslim market". China Daily. 2008-07-09. Retrieved 2009-07-14.
  7. ↑ "Muslim Media Network". Muslim Media Network. 2008-03-24. Retrieved 2009-07-14.
  8. ↑ Forbes, Andrew ; Henley, David (1997, 2011). Traders of the Golden Triangle (Hui Muslims of Yunnan). Bangkok: Teak House, 1997; republished Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books, 2011. ASIN: B006GMID5K
  9. ↑ LEI, Wan ((2010/2)). "The Chinese Islamic "Goodwill Mission to the Middle East" During the Anti-Japanese War". DÎVÂN DISIPLINLERARASI ÇALISMALAR DERGISI. cilt 15 (sayi 29): 139–141. Retrieved 19 June 2014. Check date values in: |date= (help)
  10. ↑ Central Press (30 Jul 1937). "He Offers Aid to Fight Japan". Herald-Journal. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
  11. ↑ 让日军闻风丧胆地回族抗日名将
  12. ↑ 还原真实的西北群马之马步芳骑八师中原抗日
  13. ↑ http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=005_dachang.inc&issue=005
  14. ↑ Woods, John E. (1998). The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe. p. 187.
  15. ↑ John E. Woods,The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe, p. 281. On 5 February 2009, the Japanese Supreme Court ordered Shyudo Higashinakano and the publisher Tendensha to pay 4 million yen in damages to Mrs. Shuqin Xia who claims to be "7–8 years old girl" appears in Magee's film. Higashinakano was unable to prove that she and the girl were different persons, and that she was not a witness of the Nanking massacre, contrary to what he had claimed in his book., Chinese hail Nanjing massacre witness' libel suite victory, english.peopledaily.com.cn, Author on Nanjing loses libel appeal, search.japantimes.co.jp
  16. ↑ Goldman,Merle (1986). Religion in Post-Mao China, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 483.1:145-56
  17. ↑ ALLÈS & CHÉRIF-CHEBBI & HALFON 2003, p. 12.
  18. ↑ bbc religion and ethics ISLAM Integration
  19. ↑ New Encyclopedia of Islam, pg. 622-25
  20. ↑ BBC 2002, China today
  21. ↑ Gladney (1999), pg. 471
  22. ↑ Beijing Review, Volume 32 1989, p. 13.
  23. ↑ Gladney 1991, p. 2.
  24. ↑ Schein 2000, p. 154.
  25. ↑ Gladney 2004, p. 66.
  26. ↑ Bulag 2010, p. 104.
  27. ↑ Gladney 2005, p. 257.
  28. ↑ Gladney 2013, p. 144.
  29. ↑ Sautman 2000, p. 79.
  30. ↑ Gladney 1996, p. 341.
  31. ↑ Lipman 1996, p. 299.
  32. ↑ Harold Miles Tanner (2009). China: a history. Hackett Publishing. p. 581. ISBN 0-87220-915-6. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  33. ↑ Gladney 2004, p. 232.
  34. ↑ Chinese Muslims in the year of the pig
  35. ↑ "Charlie Hebdo Attack Shows Need for Press Limits, Xinhua Says". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 14 January 2015.
  36. ↑ "Beijing jumps onto Paris attack to feed state propaganda machine". Japan Times. Retrieved 14 January 2015.
  37. ↑ Senate (U S ) Committee on Foreign Relations (2005). State Dept (U S ), ed. Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2004. Compiled by State Dept (U S ) (illustrated ed.). Government Printing Office. pp. 159–60. ISBN 0160725526. Retrieved 24 April 2014. horizontal tab character in |others= at position 12 (help)
  38. ↑ Kees Versteegh; Mushira Eid (2005). Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics: A-Ed. Brill. pp. 383–. ISBN 978-90-04-14473-6. The People's Republic, founded in 1949, banned private confessional teaching from the early 1950s to the 1980s, until a more liberal stance allowed religious mosque education to resume and private Muslim schools to open. Moreoever, except in Xinjiang for fear of secessionist feelings, the government allowed and sometimes encouraged the founding of private Muslim schools in order to provide education for people who could not attend increasingly expensive state schools or who left them early, for lack of money or lack of satisfactory achievements.
  39. ↑ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGXtgvjkpgQ
  40. ↑ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zB98XLc-J6o
  41. ↑ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xa7m9slJRo
  42. 1 2 ALLÈS & CHÉRIF-CHEBBI & HALFON 2003, p. 14.
  43. ↑ Senate (U S ) Committee on Foreign Relations (2005). State Dept (U S ), ed. Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2004. Compiled by State Dept (U S ) (illustrated ed.). Government Printing Office. p. 160. ISBN 0160725526. Retrieved 24 April 2014. horizontal tab character in |others= at position 12 (help)
  44. ↑ Szadziewski, Henryk. "Religious Repression of Uyghurs in East Turkestan". Venn Institute. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
  45. ↑ Beech, Hannah (Aug 12, 2014). "If China Is Anti-Islam, Why Are These Chinese Muslims Enjoying a Faith Revival?". TIME magazine. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  46. ↑ Bovingdon, Gardner (2013). The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (illustrated ed.). Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231519419. Retrieved 24 April 2014.
  47. ↑ Savadove, Bill. 2005. "Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland; Muslim Sect in Ningxia Accepts Beijing's Authority and Is Allowed to Build a Virtual Religious State." South China Morning Post, August 17.
  48. ↑ Rudelson & Rudelson 1997, p. 31.
  49. ↑ Rudelson & Rudelson 1997, pp. 46-7.
  50. ↑ Central Asia Monitor 1993, p. 19.
  51. ↑ Mackerras 2003, p. 118.
  52. ↑ Svanberg & Westerlund 2012, p. 202.
  53. ↑ Rudelson & Rudelson 1997, p. 81.
  54. ↑ Rudelson & Rudelson 1997, p. 129.
  55. ↑ Svanberg & Westerlund 2012, p. 205.
  56. ↑ Starr 2004, p. 311.
  57. ↑ Starr 2004, p. 113.
  58. ↑ Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China". Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  59. ↑ Safran, William (1998). Nationalism and ethnoregional identities in China. Psychology Press. p. 35. ISBN 0-7146-4921-X. Retrieved 2011-01-11.
  60. ↑ Zenn, Jacob (March 17, 2011). "Jihad in China? Marketing the Turkistan Islamic Party". Terrorism Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation. 9 (11). Retrieved 18 September 2015.
  61. ↑ Zenn, Jacob (February 2013). "Terrorism and Islamic Radicalization in Central Asia A Compendium of Recent Jamestown Analysis" (PDF): 57. Retrieved 18 September 2015. horizontal tab character in |title= at position 48 (help)
  62. ↑ Safran William (13 May 2013). Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China. Routledge. pp. 36–. ISBN 978-1-136-32423-9.Safran William (13 May 2013). Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China. Routledge. pp. 36–. ISBN 1-136-32416-X.
  63. ↑ Huan Gao (15 July 2011). Women and Heroin Addiction in China's Changing Society. Taylor & Francis. pp. –. ISBN 978-1-136-66156-3.
  64. ↑ Yongming Zhou (1999). Anti-drug Crusades in Twentieth-century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 128–. ISBN 978-0-8476-9598-0.
  65. ↑ Susan K. McCarthy (15 December 2011). Communist multiculturalism: ethnic revival in southwest China. University of Washington Press. pp. 140–. ISBN 978-0-295-80041-7.
  66. ↑ Demick, Barbara (23 June 2008). "Tibetan-Muslim tensions roil China". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on June 22, 2010. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  67. ↑ Mayaram, Shail (2009). The other global city. Taylor Francis US. p. 75. ISBN 0-415-99194-3. Retrieved 2010-07-30.
  68. ↑ "Police shut Muslim quarter in Lhasa". CNN. LHASA, Tibet. 28 March 2008. Archived from the original on April 4, 2008.
  69. 1 2 3 Fischer, Andrew Martin (September 2005). "Close encounters of in Inner-Asian kind: Tibetan–Muslim coexistence and conflict in Tibet, past and present" (PDF). CSRC Working Paper series. Crisis States Research Centre (Working Paper no.68): 1–2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 January 2006. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  70. ↑ A.A. (Nov 11, 2012). "The living picture of frustration". The Economist. Retrieved 2014-01-15.
  71. ↑ ALLÈS & CHÉRIF-CHEBBI & HALFON 2003, p. 13.
  72. ↑ Chinese Muslim literature
  73. ↑ Gibb 1954, p. 771.
  74. ↑ Murata, pp. 13-14.
  75. ↑ Mao 2011.
  76. ↑ "The China Monthly, Volumes 3-4" 1941, p. 14.
  77. ↑ O'Toole & Tsʻai 1941,
  78. ↑ "The China Monthly, Volumes 3-4" 1941, p. 13.
  79. ↑ "The China Monthly, Volumes 3-4" 1941, p. 14.
  80. ↑ ed. Kurzman 2002, p. 368.
  81. ↑ ed. Kurzman 2002, p. 373.
  82. ↑ "China Magazine, Volumes 6-7" 1941, p. 21.
  83. ↑ "China at War, Volume 6" 1941, p. 21.
  84. ↑ "Asia and the Americas, Volume 42, Issues 1-6" 1942, p. 21.
  85. ↑ "Asia, Volume 42" 1942, p. 21.
  86. ↑ 编导：韩玲 (Director: Han Ling) 摄像：李斌 (Photography: Li Bin) (央视国际 (CCTV international)). 2005年02月24日 16:22.
  87. ↑ Jaschok & Shui 2000, p. 96.
  88. ↑ Jaschok & Shui 2000, p. 97.
  89. ↑ Matsumoto 2004,
Bibliography
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